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Columbia flight control knew...

The shuttle would likely not survive, but didn't tell the crew. Would you rather know and decide your fate or is ignorance bliss?

by Anonymousreply 5502/05/2013

They had a right to know any information which affected them. Some people like to pray before they die, so it is extremely heinous for such information to be withheld from them, if OP is telling the truth.

by Anonymousreply 102/01/2013

who/what is OP?

by Anonymousreply 202/01/2013

You know what the last thing on the flight recorder was?

by Anonymousreply 302/01/2013

"Don't touch that dial!"

by Anonymousreply 402/01/2013

"What does this button do??"

(alternate version)

by Anonymousreply 502/01/2013

I had heard they were letting the woman fly land it and the last thing was telling her to quit putting on her lipstick and pay attention to the sky?

by Anonymousreply 602/01/2013

Tell them so they can say goodbye to their families etc.

by Anonymousreply 702/01/2013

If the crew had had guns, the crash would never have happened!

by Anonymousreply 802/01/2013

"Don't text and drive!"

by Anonymousreply 902/01/2013

[quote]Tell them so they can say goodbye to their families etc.

I can make this story worse: Laurel Clark, one of the mission specialists, was married to Dr. Jon Clark, one of the flight surgeons for the mission. He's talked about coming in to Mission Control and seeing the information about the loss of the tiles on the NASA intranet.

by Anonymousreply 1002/01/2013

This article can't be true. This Clark guy sounds like a delusional, dicey alcoholic.

Had NASA known from blastoff as the article claims, there would have been enough time to abort the mission, linger in close orbit, and have another shuttle at least attempt a rescue. If no rescue shuttle was available, shame on NASA for poor emergency backup planning.

And no way would have NASA kept them in the dark. Too many lawsuits from relatives who would claim they deserved a goodbye and/or final prayers, as stated above.

by Anonymousreply 1102/01/2013

If they told them it would've deteriorated into a scene out of Event Horizon.

by Anonymousreply 1202/01/2013

You can't sue NASA if your rocket ship blows up.

by Anonymousreply 1302/01/2013

I heard they had a man land and he was told to quit watching Big Tittied Mommies and focus on the landing.

by Anonymousreply 1402/01/2013

PLEASE F&F the irritating people/OP who keep posting the non-stop link to British tabloids and newspapers.

ENOUGH. Webmaster, is this a U.K. Discussion forum??

by Anonymousreply 1602/01/2013

Does this make everyone feel better?

by Anonymousreply 1702/01/2013

[quote] PLEASE F&F the irritating people/OP who keep posting the non-stop link to British tabloids and newspapers.

It annoys me that the links are Daily Mail, a very trashy newspaper with right wing bias. But otherwise, piss off. There's no rule that only US sites can be linked to, or US subject matter either for that matter.

by Anonymousreply 1802/01/2013

[quote]Several engineers at the space agency suspected something was wrong. Fuzzy video showed foam breaking off the orbiter's external fuel tank and hitting its left wing during blast off. But no one knew if there was damage. At that time NASA had no options for repair. The crew was on a science mission, nowhere near the International Space Station. They had no robotic arm to look at the wing, no way to repair the wing if they had damage, and it would take much too long to send up another space shuttle to rescue the crew.

[quote]It was agonizing for Rocha, who had begged the Mission Management Team to ask the Department of Defense to use whatever it had to take high resolution photos. He was turned down. In an exclusive interview with ABC News in 2003 he detailed how his requests were repeatedly denied.

[quote]"I made a phone call to the manager of the shuttle engineering office, the same person that had relayed the 'No" message to me from orbiter management. I was still pretty agitated and upset. Had he spoken to our engineering director about this? I wanted the director of JSC engineering to be informed. Had he been informed? And he said no. I was thunderstruck and astonished again."

This is all you need to know about NASA, and it wasn't a new problem in 2003, or in 1986.

It was a problem first formally noted in 1966 by Thomas baron, who listed the management and cultural problems present in NASA during the disastrous Apollo 1 fire -- a culture of coverup.

Note the link cites "Apollo 204." NASA decided not to list the accident under its flight name to keep it from tainting the rest of the program.

by Anonymousreply 1902/01/2013

Some more on Thomas Baron:

by Anonymousreply 2002/01/2013

[quote]Would you rather know and decide your fate or is ignorance bliss?

I thought I would answer your question, OP. I think I would prefer to know, but I totally understand flight control not wanting to tell them. They were probably trying frantically to find a solution right up to the end and they wanted to avoid panic. I can't imagine what it must have been like. I've read some of the accounts of the mission where Gus Grissom, Roger Chaffee and Ed White died when their command module caught fire. The thought of being trapped in a tin can to die like that was harrowing, to say the least.

I'm not sure they had the capacity for the crew to be able to communicate with loved ones on the ground. I would think before you ever boarded a rocket into space, you would have told everybody how much you loved them and made your last wishes known, had your will drawn up and that sort of thing, just in case.

by Anonymousreply 2102/01/2013

Can somebody please tell me who/what the fuck OP is?

by Anonymousreply 2202/01/2013

Those who knew there was a problem knew only that there was a problem. It was possible it would be fatal, but they didn't know for sure.

What the ground crew might have done is told the crew there was a problem and they were not sure what the outcome would be. Most of the crew were military officers long schooled and accepting of the fact of their expendability, but it didn't have to be as final as that. Rescue might not have been possible, but had they been informed and were able to do an inspection via space walk, maybe they could have tried a fix to at least improve their chances, and give them some control over the issue.

The real problem was, the issue hadn't been properly communicated through the agency, and situations where the husband of one of the crew found out about the problem over the web instead of through the proper channels.

by Anonymousreply 2302/01/2013

The shuttle was old and poorly maintained. They spent all sorts of extra money on "security" to protect the Israeli war hero-turned astronaut. Then they blew him up themselves along with the rest of the crew. If NASA had been more concerned with safety than PR, they might have had a successful mission.

It was the same deal with the Challenger: they forced a launch on a bad day because Reagan was supposed to refer to the shuttle in his State of the Union Address that night.

by Anonymousreply 2402/01/2013

[quote]Rescue might not have been possible

Actually, it was. Columbia was assigned for a very long mission, so they carried a lot of extra oxygen and food, which meant they could stay in orbit a good deal beyond their already-long mission. Ground crews were in the process of prepping Atlantis for a mission that was supposed to launch a few weeks after Columbia's intended return. It was later determined that Atlantis could have been prepped and launched in time to get Columbia's crew down.

With all that said, every member of that crew knew from the moment the clock hit T-0 that something bad could happen. They knew the risks, but did it anyway.

I remember John Glenn talking about a rather macabre joke Mission Control told him as he was waiting for his Friendship 7 launch: "What does it feel like to be sitting in a rocket built by the lowest bidder?"

by Anonymousreply 2502/01/2013

Then r25 all the more reason they should have brought the crew to the table.

by Anonymousreply 2602/01/2013

Of course they were going to get the crew to risk re-entry. Can you imagine what would have happened if an orbiting piece of debris, designed to re-enter the atmosphere either intact or in large pieces?

by Anonymousreply 2702/01/2013

Remember the Mormons spokesman? All I could think was, well, some fucking Mormons have been hiring from their church rather than for competence.

by Anonymousreply 2802/01/2013

[quote]Of course they were going to get the crew to risk re-entry. Can you imagine what would have happened if an orbiting piece of debris, designed to re-enter the atmosphere either intact or in large pieces?

They could have de-orbited it remotely.

by Anonymousreply 2902/01/2013

"Of course they were going to get the crew to risk re-entry. Can you imagine what would have happened if an orbiting piece of debris, designed to re-enter the atmosphere either intact or in large pieces?"

We don't have to imagine. It blew to bits and didn't hurt anyone on the ground. Baron was sexy nerd cute big dick faced when he was younger so I believe him.

by Anonymousreply 3002/01/2013

[quote]You can't sue NASA if your rocket ship blows up.

But you can if they withhold information that results in an uncontested explosion.

by Anonymousreply 3102/01/2013

R31. Actually, there was a $27M settlement for the families.

by Anonymousreply 3202/01/2013

If it's true that flight control knew, they should've found a way to prevent coverage of the landing.

by Anonymousreply 3302/01/2013

I wonder why they didn't bother to rescue them if they had the ability. Did they prefer to bet on the damage not being as bad as thought?

Obviously. Still, very odd.

by Anonymousreply 3402/02/2013

Maybe part of their mission was covert and more valuable than they were.

by Anonymousreply 3502/02/2013

[quote] It was possible it would be fatal, but they didn't know for sure.

And what about those people who were at the top of the World Trade Center when it collapsed? They simply rode the implosion all the way to the bottom and walked away.

by Anonymousreply 3602/02/2013

What is wrong with British tabloids? Is there a protocol for which news source we are supposed to use on here? If you see the offensive foreign journalism venues in the link then don't fucking click on it. Sign of the times - you cunts can't take care of yourselves you have to whine to some fucking higher power to sort out your problems.

Grow the fuck up.

by Anonymousreply 4002/02/2013

10 years later, Columbia disaster a fresh memory

By Mike Tolsonand Cindy Horswell

Updated 11:15 pm, Friday, February 1, 2013

HEMPHILL — The first day of February 2003 broke cool and clear over most of Texas — a perfect Saturday morning without a cloud in sight or a breeze to speak of — so there was scant reason to look up ... until there was.

Phil Brown, a retired mechanic, still remembers a big boom at 8 a.m., followed by sounds of objects approaching this East Texas town at high speed, some preceded by mini-booms that echoed around his home at Toledo Bend Reservoir, which was still shrouded in early-morning mist.

“I thought we were being bombed,” Brown said. “It was foggy over the lake that day. So I couldn't see but only hear things dropping. They sounded hot because they kind of sizzled when they hit the water.”

There are things you remember and things you cannot forget. The early morning of Feb. 1, 2003, is among the latter for most around here, whose land and property were pelted by thousands of pieces of debris after the high-altitude disintegration of space shuttle Columbia during re-entry. For an unlucky few, those pieces included remains of the seven astronauts on board — Rick Husband, William McCool, Michael Anderson, Kalpana Chawla, David Brown, Laurel Clark and Ilan Ramon — but for all, the memories persist.

The community's effort to pick up as many of Columbia's pieces as could be found, and treat those pieces with respect and dignity, brought people together and gave them a connection to NASA that none could have imagined.

“This has touched every life and heart here,” said Marsha Cooper, a U.S. Forest Service fire prevention officer who helped with the search. “It's something we'll carry with us always.”

The spacecraft, doomed by damage to an exposed portside wing panel that was normally heat-resistant, actually began to lose pieces west of California during its meteoric descent. Debris reports came in from places as disparate as Canada and the Bahamas, but most of what remained landed in Texas.

This area quickly became a “ground zero,” of sorts, where not only the remains of all the astronauts were found but also the 800-pound nose cone and the orbiter's version of a flight data recorder. A special rapport developed between the community and the astronauts' families, a connection that seemed almost beyond coincidence.

Cooper recalled telling the wife of Husband, the shuttle commander, how a pastor had recited a special Bible verse at every site where astronaut remains were recovered in Sabine County. That verse, Joshua 1:5-9, reads in part: “Be strong and courageous. Do not be terrified; do not be discouraged, for the Lord your God will be with you wherever you go.”

Cooper said Husband's wife looked stunned upon hearing this. This was the exact verse that her husband had recited from memory when all the astronaut families held hands during their last supper together before being quarantined before their mission. That verse is now etched into a black rock outside the Patricia Huffman Smith NASA Museum, Remembering Columbia, in Hemphill.

By the time the search — by land and by air — ended at the end of April, almost 84,000 pieces had been found. In all, about 38 percent of the orbiter was recovered.

Those parts that could be identified were placed on the floor of a hangar at Kennedy Space Center atop a shuttle-shaped grid. The team in charge of the reconstruction helped scientists conclude that a compromised wing panel was the culprit in the shuttle's demise.

Jon Cowart, the chief reconstruction engineer who oversaw day-to-day operations at the hangar, likened his team to a “NASA version of CSI,” tasked with examining every piece to see if it bore a clue. The discovery of a plasma-sharpened piece of carbon panel from the left wing offered final confirmation that a hole in the panel had been Columbia's undoing. The team's report capped months of ceaseless work: seven days a week, 12 to 14 hours on many days, with little time for family life or personal matters.

by Anonymousreply 4102/02/2013

lol r4

by Anonymousreply 4202/02/2013

>>It was the same deal with the Challenger: they forced a launch on a bad day because Reagan was supposed to refer to the shuttle in his State of the Union Address that night.

Sickening.

by Anonymousreply 4302/02/2013

Columbia Crew Survival Report

Laurel Clark's husband, also a NASA MD, had to pressure the agency to investigate exactly how they died and how to improve survivability in future manned space vehicle design.

Phasing out the shuttle took care of 95% of the issues

by Anonymousreply 4402/02/2013

NASA Report (Linked above):

[quote]3.4.1.3 Orbital operations -- The Columbia orbiter performed satisfactorily on orbit and the crew worked well as a team, accomplishing all scientific goals. On Flight Day 8, the crew was notified via email about the foam strike, but was told it was “not even worth mentioning other than wanting to make sure that [the crew is] not surprised by it in a question from a reporter.” The capsule communicator (CAPCOM) also relayed that there was “no concern for [reinforced carbon-carbon] or tile damage” and that there was “absolutely no concern for entry”. A video clip of the strike was included with the e-mail. No changes in the mission profile were thought necessary or recommended by the shuttle Mission Management Team, and the entry was flown as originally planned.

So they were told, and then advised not to worry about it.

by Anonymousreply 4502/02/2013

Wow, so from r44s link, most were immediately unconscious from the depressurization, then had their brains dashed as they spun, then burned in the explosion, which was when most recorded loss of blood and air circulation, then ejected into space and impacted the ground.

It was quick but horrific, but they were mercifully unconscious.

by Anonymousreply 4602/02/2013

[quote] remember John Glenn talking about a rather macabre joke Mission Control told him as he was waiting for his Friendship 7 launch: "What does it feel like to be sitting in a rocket built by the lowest bidder?"

Absolutely priceless.

by Anonymousreply 4702/02/2013

[quote] This article can't be true. This Clark guy sounds like a delusional, dicey alcoholic.

The original source is this blog by Wayne Hale, a former Shuttle Program Manager. It's all there.

NASA is astonishingly passive-aggressive. They rejected offers of high resolution imaging of Columbia from classified sources because...well then they'd know for sure.

No contingency plan for a rescue was in place, so they apparently wrote off the Shuttle and crew. Turns out, rescue may actually have been possible.

by Anonymousreply 4802/02/2013

Survey: NASA Workers Afraid to Speak Up

Many NASA Workers Still Afraid to Speak Up About Safety Concerns, Survey Finds

The Associated Press

CAPE CANAVERAL, Fla. April 12, 2004 — Many NASA workers feel unappreciated by the agency and are still afraid to speak up about safety concerns, more than a year after the shuttle Columbia was doomed by those very problems, according to a survey released Monday.

The 145-page report includes an assessment of NASA's culture by a behavioral science company in California, and a three-year plan for change.

"Safety is something to which NASA personnel are strongly committed in concept, but NASA has not yet created a culture that is fully supportive of safety," the report says. "Open communication is not yet the norm, and people do not feel fully comfortable raising safety concerns to management."

The report notes that excellence is treasured when it comes to technical work, but is not considered imperative for management skills.

"There appear to be pockets where the management chain (possibly unintentionally) sent signals that the raising of issues is not welcome," the report says. "This is inconsistent with an organization that truly values integrity."

Last summer, Columbia accident investigators condemned NASA's safety culture and put as much blame on poor management as the flyaway piece of foam insulation that tore a hole in the shuttle's left wing at liftoff. The shuttle was destroyed during re-entry on Feb. 1, 2003, killing all seven astronauts aboard.

In February, NASA hired Behavioral Science Technology Inc. of Ojai, Calif., to develop and administer a plan for changing NASA's culture. The company conducted a survey at all NASA locations, including the Jet Propulsion Laboratory in Pasadena, Calif. Only NASA employees, not contract workers, took part.

The two lowest-scoring categories were "Perceived Organizational Support" and "Upward Communication."

On more than one occasion, workers hung back at the end of a group interview session and only then expressed their views, privately, about communication barriers, BST said.

by Anonymousreply 4902/02/2013

 

by Anonymousreply 5002/03/2013

•tThomas Ronald Baron actually wrote two reports. The first, a 55-page report, was presented to NASA officials in late 1966, alleging improper actions and irregularities he had witnessed while working at the Kennedy Space Center (KSC). NAA managers met with Baron to address his report; they decided that some of Baron's criticisms had merit, but that the rest of his report was inapplicable or unfounded for a variety of reasons. After leaking his report to the media, he was fired. Baron then started to assemble a more thorough report. After the Apollo 1 fire, he delivered this report, containing at least 500 pages, to the Congressional committees investigating the incident. This report disappeared after his death, and has not been found since.

•tThomas Ronald "Tom" Baron (died 27 April 1967) was a quality control and safety inspector for North American Aviation (NAA), when it was the primary contractor to build the Apollo command module.

After the Apollo 1 fire Baron wrote a 500-page report on NASA safety protocol violations, which he gave to Rep. Olin E. Teague's investigation at Cape Kennedy, Florida on April 21, 1967. When Baron mentioned the report during his testimony, Teague told him "Your report went to the chairman of the full committee, not to me", and that "something of that length ... we can take it as an exhibit."

Six days after his testimony, Baron was killed instantly, along with his wife and stepdaughter, when a train crashed into their car near their home in Florida. Baron's death, which was witnessed by a woman, was later ruled as an accident, with no suspicion of foul play. The chairman of the NASA Oversight Committee claimed that Baron had made a valuable contribution to the Apollo fire probe, but that he had been "overzealous".

by Anonymousreply 5102/03/2013

The Baron Report, Apollo 204, Summary:

•tLack of coordination between people in responsible positions.

•tLack of communication between almost everyone.

•tThe fact that people in responsible positions did not take many of the problems seriously.

•tEngineers operating equipment instead of technical people.

•tMany technicians do not know their job. This is partly due to the fact that they are constantly shifted from one job to another.

•tPeople are lax when it comes to safety.

•tPeople are lax when it comes to maintaining cleanliness levels.

•tWe do not make a large enough effort to enforce the PQCP.

•tPeople do not get an official tie-in time period.

•tWe do not maintain proper work and systems records.

•tNAA does not give the working force a feeling of accomplishment.

•tThere is not one procedure that I can remember that was completed without a deviation, either written or oral.

•tAllowing ill practices to continue when the Company is aware of them.

•tThe constant transfer of QC and technical types of people to different types of tasks. Many of the techs will tell the QC man that they have never done that type of job before, or used that type of equipment before. This is one of the most prevalent problems NAA has.

by Anonymousreply 5202/03/2013

[quote]I remember John Glenn talking about a rather macabre joke Mission Control told him as he was waiting for his Friendship 7 launch: "What does it feel like to be sitting in a rocket built by the lowest bidder?"

I was halfway through a precarious evolution in the military when I realized that the only thing between me and death was installed by the lowest bidder.

by Anonymousreply 5302/03/2013

Part of the problem with NASA is it's a weird collusion of military, corporate America, and the academia. None of those three really ever plays nicely together.

In fact it's a wonder that DARPA can get done what it does get done, but DARPA smartly decided they were primarily project managers - and let the universities figure it out.

by Anonymousreply 5402/03/2013

r51 - It thought that you were going to imply that Baron's accidental death was no accident...

by Anonymousreply 5502/05/2013
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